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Abstract 
Unlike traditional media, our interactions with political parties via social media are 
generally public, subject to scrutiny by others and, consequently, a self-presentation 
concern. This paper contributes to theory on impression management within social 
network sites (SNSs) by providing an understanding of the effect of visible affiliation 
on page ‘Liking’ behavior in the context of political parties; specifically, the possible 
association with social anxiety and the use of protective impression management. We 
predict that while users may be motivated to ‘Like’ a political party, some may feel 
socially anxious about the impressions their friends may derive from this action, and 
so ultimately choose to refrain from ‘Liking’ the party. Furthermore, we propose a 
new function of ‘Secret Likes’ (i.e. ‘Likes’ that others cannot see) as a means to 
increase gateway interactions. A survey of eligible voters (n=225) was conducted in 
the month prior to the 2015 UK general election, examining behavior associated with 
the Facebook pages of the two largest political parties. Results support that 
conspicuous affiliation with political parties indeed hinders intention to ‘Like’ 
political pages and is associated with social anxiety. ‘Secret Likes’ were found to be a 
successful method to increase gateway interactions. In addition to the theoretical 
contribution, implications for political party communications and site designers are 
considered. 
 
Keywords: Impression management; political engagement; social networking sites; 
self-presentation; Facebook; politics 
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1. Introduction 
John, aged 29 from the north of England, works as a banker in London and is yet to 
decide for whom to vote in the upcoming general election. Although most of his 
friends and family are strong Labour supporters (a center-left party), he is undecided. 
When browsing his Facebook newsfeed he sees an advert by the Conservatives (a 
center-right party) with a statement that resonates somewhat with his own views. 
Alongside the advert is the option to ‘Like’ the party. John feels motivated to click 
‘Like’ as by doing so he will receive content from the party via Facebook that would 
be of interest to him in deciding for whom to vote. As his cursor hovers over the ‘Like’ 
button he becomes anxious. He worries about what his Facebook friends will think of 
him if they see he has ‘Liked’ the party that opposes their views. He decides to play it 
safe and chooses not to ‘Like’ the party but still desires a way to receive the party’s 
updates via Facebook. 
 
Acquiring ‘Likes’ for brand pages elicits numerous advantages for organizations (see 
Lipsman et al., 2012). Similarly, engaging the electorate in this way affords benefits 
to both political parties (e.g. promoting policies, donation seeking, changing attitudes) 
and SNS users (e.g. entertainment, information, identity affirmation) (Hanson et al., 
2010; Macafee 2013). Although some recent work has focused on political 
engagement and SNSs (e.g. Baek, 2015; Conroy et al., 2012; Kim 2011; Kim et al., 
2013; Park 2013; Vraga et al., 2015), it has largely failed to address the important 
behavior of connecting and interacting with political parties, for example, in the form 
of ‘Liking’ their Facebook page or ‘Following’ them on Twitter, which are critical 
gateway steps to engagement (Sashi, 2012).  
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Despite the benefits, and arguably the ease with which it is possible to ‘Like’ a 
Facebook page, UK political parties receive fewer ‘Likes’ than might be expected 
given there are approximately 27 million active UK Facebook users (42% of overall 
population) (Fleischmann, 2015). The Conservative party won the UK general 
election in 2015, accumulating more than 11 million votes (36.9% vote share) (BBC 
News, 2015). However, the day before the election their Facebook page had only 
450,000 ‘Likes’ (Rothwell, 2015). Similarly Labour, who came second with just over 
9 million votes (30.4% vote share) (BBC News, 2015), had just under 300,000 ‘Likes’ 
(Rothwell, 2015). The stark discrepancy between the number of votes and the number 
of Facebook ‘Likes’ given overall adoption of Facebook suggests possible barriers to 
‘Liking’ political parties. This paper examines self-presentational concern as a key 
barrier that may exist. 
 
People refrain from, or feel anxious about, actions that could instill negative 
impressions in the minds of their audience (Leary, 1996; Leary and Kowalski, 1995). 
In view of the concern about self-presentation on Facebook and that ‘Liking’ a page 
contributes to the self that is presented (Hollenbeck and Kaikati, 2012; Zhao et al., 
2008), it follows that the choice to interact – or not – with a political party’s page is 
an impression management issue. Thus, it is distinct from more traditional methods of 
receiving party communications (e.g. newspaper, televised broadcasts), where 
engagement is largely private or at least not broadcast in a semi-public environment. 
Drawing from the vignette, John, although motivated to ‘Like’ the Conservatives’ 
Facebook page, manages impressions by not ‘Liking’ the page. This is because he is 
worried about the projected impressions (i.e. image) presented to his ‘friends’. Such 
concern about impressions is even more pertinent since the release of third-party 
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applications that quickly illuminate political affiliation, allowing users to “flush out 
friends who have ‘Liked’ UKIP or Britain First [political parties]” (Waugh, 2014, 
p.1).  
 
Through the lens of Impression Management Theory (Leary, 1996; Goffman, 1973) 
our overall aim is to understand the phenomenon highlighted in the vignette, i.e. why 
users may choose not to ‘Like’ a political party’s Facebook page, even when they are 
motivated to do so. To accomplish this overall aim we address to specific goals. First 
test the theorized association between three constructs (see Leary and Kowalski, 
1995): (1) Projected impressions - the perceived impressions instilled in the minds of 
the audience associated with political affiliation (i.e. having ‘Liked’ a political party’s 
page); (2) Social anxiety - the concern that results if projected impressions are 
predicted to be undesirable; and (3) Impression management - behavior enacted to 
protect against undesired impressions (e.g. intention to ‘Like’). Based on Goffman’s 
(1973) theorization of region behavior – that people are freer to behave as they wish 
when out of the gaze of the audience – our second goal is to test whether users would 
have a greater intention to ‘Like’ a political party’s Facebook page if this action 
remained private (i.e. not visible to others). Through this research we aim to 
contribute to theory and practice by providing an understanding of the effect of visible 
affiliation on ‘Liking’ behavior in the context of political parties. The insight gained, 
and design and managerial implications for increasing gateway interactions we 
provide, may also be useful for other organizations operating SNS pages.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First we present an in-depth 
analysis of related literature to reveal the research gaps, leading to the development of 
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hypotheses to address these. The quantitative research methodology employing 
mediation and within-subject tests is then outlined, followed by presentation of the 
results and discussion of these. Finally the paper is concluded, major implications are 
identified, and limitations are discussed offering future research directions.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Impression Management and Social anxiety 
Impression Management is the process whereby individuals attempt to control the 
image they project to others (i.e. their self-presentation), to instill a desired impression 
(Leary and Kowalski, 1990). This endeavor is motivated by possible social/economic 
gains or losses and self-esteem, and to support a desired identity or avoid one that is 
undesired (Leary, 1996). Events that challenge the projection of a desired image are 
known as self-presentational predicaments (e.g. falling over in public) and are 
accompanied by social anxiety (Leary and Kowalski, 1995).  
 
Social anxiety describes the cognitive and affective responses that arise from the 
prospect of negative interpersonal evaluation in the presence of a potential or actual 
audience (Schlenker and Leary, 1982); hence it is different to other forms of anxiety 
that are not inextricably linked with social interaction. When self-presenters believe 
they have fallen below the perceived standards of their audience, social anxiety will 
arise, which leads to impression management to reconcile the discrepancy (Arkin and 
Sheppard, 1990). Furthermore, the size of the discrepancy (i.e. between the actual or 
potential undesired image and the one which is desired) is positively related to the 
magnitude of social anxiety felt and, thus, the motivation to manage the predicament 
(Leary, 1996). 
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Impression management to resolve self-presentational predicament has been 
categorized as either defensive or protective (Schütz, 1998a). The former is enacted 
when negative impressions have already been instilled (e.g. apologies), whereas the 
latter is used to avoid potential negative impressions (e.g. choosing to be quiet). Such 
forms of impression management have been reported to be used by both politicians 
and electorates as they aim to maintain the projection of their desired ‘political self’ 
(Kubal, 1998; Schütz, 1998b).  
 
2.2 Managing impressions on SNS 
SNSs are novel environments for self-presentation and draw much scholarly attention 
(e.g. Lang and Barton, 2015; Tifferet and Vilnai-Yavetz, 2014; Wohn and 
Spottswood, 2016). Crucially they provide a wealth of new technologies which can be 
used to sustain, maintain and challenge the creation of desired online personas (see 
Hollenbeck and Katia, 2011; Zhao et al., 2008), one of which is visible affiliation 
with pages through the ‘Like’ button. Furthermore, opposed to offline where 
audiences are largely small and segregated, users present to large audiences through 
SNSs that simultaneously include those from different social spheres (e.g. work, 
family) (see Binder et al, 2009; De Wolf et al., 2014). This has been found to be 
problematic as different spheres have different expectations of what is a desired 
impression (e.g. what is suitable for some is not for others), increasing the chance of 
social anxiety and the need to impression manage (see Lampinen, 2009; Marder et al., 
2012; Marwick and Boyd, 2011).  
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To avoid self-presentational predicaments on Facebook users have been found to self-
censor the posts they make, the pictures they upload or are tagged in, and the brands 
they ‘Like’ (See Das and Kramer, 2013; Hollenbeck and Katia, 2012; Lang & Barton, 
2015). Furthermore recent research has found that users self-censor their offline 
behavior in fear that content will be communicated online causing self-presentational 
predicaments (Marder et al., 2016). While sites provide privacy settings to segregate 
audiences and manage content disclosure, these are largely underutilized (Marder et 
al., 2012) and confusing due to their evolving nature (Kleinman, 2014). The strategies 
discussed here are akin with Schütz’s (1998a) protective impression management. 
 
2.3 Politics and SNS 
“Facebook has emerged as a powerful social-marketing and advertising platform” 
(Lipsman et al., 2012, p.42; see also Wattal et al., 2010). Recent political ballots have 
been discussed as ‘social media elections’ (Wendling, 2015), due to the profound 
effect these are suggested to have on political engagement. Rainie et al. (2012) found 
66% of US social media users have carried out political or civic activities through 
these sites. In 2013 Beppe Grillo’s harness of social media helped him win more than 
25% of the vote in Italy’s election, where pollsters put him at just 5% nine months 
earlier (Bartlett, 2013). Moreover, Ipsos Mori (2015) found that young people feel 
that their vote is influenced much more by social, rather than traditional, media.  
 
There are a number of benefits for political parties adopting web technologies, such as 
stimulating collective interest (Putnam, 2000), mobilization of support (Leighley, 
1996), and an efficient means to propagate information, values and ideology (Gibson, 
2001). Additionally, SNSs are increasingly being used to forecast election results 
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albeit with limited accuracy (see Burnap et al., 2016). From the perspective of the 
SNS user a number of studies have provided motivations for political engagement; 
these include gathering information, entertainment, participating in groups, and 
interacting with likeminded others (Ancu and Cozma, 2009; Brown et al., 2007; 
Hanson et al., 2010). 
 
Political engagement through SNSs has received some attention in academic literature 
over recent years, yet an important gateway interaction to such engagement (e.g. 
‘Liking’ or ‘Following’ a party’s page) has been somewhat neglected. Acquiring 
‘Likes’ or fans enables party communications to appear naturally in the feeds of the 
user, thus allowing for the benefits discussed above (e.g. propagation of values, cost 
efficiency). Marketing literature provides support for the important role of page 
‘Likes’ in communicating with customers and increasing engagement (Jahn and 
Kunz, 2012; Dholakia and Durham, 2012). Political parties appear to have 
acknowledged this importance focusing an increasing budget on SNSs: for example, 
the UK Conservatives’ projected spending on Facebook was estimated at over £1m a 
year (Hawkins, 2015). However, the effect of this is debatable as Pennington et al. 
(2015) were unable to find a significant link between ‘Liking’ an individual political 
candidate’s page and political engagement (i.e. increased attention to politics, 
participation and discussion). This paper is less concerned with ‘Liking’ being a 
gateway interaction to political engagement in the broad sense discussed by 
Pennington et al (2015) and more about the interaction (i.e. ‘Liking’ a political party’s 
page) that allows visibility of a party’s content which may lead to SNS user 
engagement with that content and consequently with the party itself. While this may 
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be considered a sub-set of overall political engagement, this is an important 
distinction. 
 
Macafee (2013) notes that the key motivations behind ‘Liking’ a political party on 
Facebook are self-presentation, entertainment, and information seeking, with the first 
found to be the strongest predictor as users viewed political affiliation as contributing 
positively to the projection of their desired self. Conversely, Kwon and Moon (2014) 
find users are cautious when making political posts, especially when their audiences 
hold diverse ideologies. Scrutiny of political beliefs is found to occur beyond a user’s 
articulated ‘friends’ to potential employers who search candidates’ SNS accounts for 
political leaning (see Landau, 2013). 
 
This literature shows that self-presentation is core to the decision to ‘Like’ a political 
party, supporting both the premise of this research and the use of Impression 
Management as the theoretical lens. 
 
3. Hypotheses development  
SNSs are hailed as a technology for self-presentation and, now, political engagement, 
although little is known about the interaction between each of these. It benefits a 
political party to get as many ‘Likes’ as possible as through this gateway interaction 
they are afforded an efficient and cost effective way to communicate with the 
electorate in order to influence their decisions. Though there are many benefits for 
users in becoming ‘fans’ (Macafee, 2013), acquiring ‘Likes’ has proven difficult for 
even the most popular parties (Hawkins, 2015). Given that ‘Liking’ a political party 
contributes visibly to a user’s online persona, we propose this may confront them with 
10 
 
a self-presentational predicament if affiliation is perceived as undesired by their 
audiences. Thus, whilst motivated to ‘Like’ a political party, users may refrain from 
clicking the ‘Like’ button to avoid negative approval from their peers (a form of 
protective impression management, see Schütz 1990a). With this in mind, we test the 
following relationship: 
 
H1a: Greater negative projected impressions related to political affiliation 
(IV) are associated with a reduction in the intention to ‘Like’ a political 
party’s Facebook page (DV). 
 
H1b: Social anxiety (M) mediates the relationship between negative projected 
impressions (IV) and intention to ‘Like’ a political party’s Facebook page 
(DV) (I.e. greater negative impressions lead to increased social anxiety 
reducing intention to ‘Like’). 
 
When actions are not visible to an audience, and thereby not susceptible to scrutiny, 
impression management is not a concern (Goffman 1973; Leary, 1995). Thus, it 
follows that users will be more inclined to ‘Like’ a political party if doing so is secret, 
as this would not contribute to their self-presentation. We propose ‘Secret Like’ as a 
new function to address the issue of self-presentational concern, giving users the 
option to make their ‘Like’ secret both at the initial time of ‘Liking’ and after a page 
is ‘Liked’. Currently, Facebook privacy settings allow a user to make all pages private 
but not individually (discussed in more detail later in the paper). To examine the 
proposed ‘Secret Like’ function we will test the following hypothesis: 
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H2: Intention to ‘Like’ a political party’s Facebook page will be greater when 
it is secret (not visible to others) compared with the status quo (visible to 
others). 
 
4. Methods 
An online survey was used to test the hypotheses, which adopted purposeful sampling 
of eligible voters in the 2015 UK general election that were also Facebook users. 
Participants were recruited through links to the survey in discussions on social media 
platforms that were initiated by national news brands (e.g. The Times, Guardian), as 
well as email lists and social media accounts associated with three Universities in 
England, Scotland and Wales. A small monetary donation to one of three well known 
charities was offered to incentivize participation. Recruitment started four weeks 
before the 7th of May election and ended one week before the polls.  
 
4.1 Measures 
To test H1a & H1b it was necessary to measure the projected image ‘Liking’ a party 
would give to others, associated social anxiety, and the participant’s intention to 
‘Like’ the respective party’s Facebook page. These constructs were measured for both 
the Conservative and Labour parties and the order of presentation was randomized. 
However, if a party was already ‘Liked’ on Facebook by a participant, then the 
questions related to this party were skipped. Hereafter, when a measured construct is 
reported the Cronbach’s alpha scores are presented for the Conservative and Labour 
parties, respectively. Appendix 1 provides details of the measures including specific 
questions, items, descriptive statistics and factor loadings. 
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To measure projected impressions the following question was used, “imagine the 
scenario where you have 'Liked' [political party’s] Facebook page and evidence of 
this has become visible to your Facebook 'friends'. Please indicate along the scale 
what image of yourself you consider this would portray to others”. A five-item, 7-
point scale (e.g. desired-undesired) was employed [α=.92; .95], adapted from Ajzen 
and Driver (1992). Social anxiety, was assessed using a four-item, 7-point scale (e.g. 
Calm-Tense), [α=.92; .92], adapted from Feldman (1995). Intention to ‘Like’ was 
measured under two conditions: first, the real life visible circumstance whereby 
“When you click 'Like' on the [political party’s] Facebook page it will be visible to 
your friends”. This was used to address H1a. Second, the hypothetical situation where 
the ‘Like’ would remain ‘Secret’ thus, “would NOT be made visible to your 
Facebook friends”. Simultaneously with the first condition, this was used to address 
H2. The order of these conditions was randomized, and a verification question was 
added to each condition to ascertain whether or not participants had answered the 
question under the correct premise. The intention to ‘Like’ measure comprised a two-
item, 7-point scale (Very Unlikely – Very Likely), [α(visible)=.82; .87; α(secret)=.91; .87], 
adapted from Bosnjak and Rudolph (2008). Factor analysis confirmed convergent and 
discriminant validity of the scales, with factor loadings greater than .50 and absence 
of cross-loadings (Appendix 1) (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
It was imperative that participants were motivated to some extent to ‘Like’ the 
political pages. If they were not it cannot be claimed that impression management 
concerns constrained their intention to ‘Like’, as arguably there would be no 
motivation to ‘Like’ in the first place. Thus motivation to like each political page was 
measured using a ten-item measure with a 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree – 
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strongly agree), adapted from Hanson et al (2010) (Appendix 2). As this measure was 
used to qualify respondents as either somewhat motivated (mean score >1) or having 
no motivation (mean score=1) tests for validity and reliability are not required. 
Furthermore, participants were asked if any privacy settings employed restricted the 
visibility of pages they ‘Liked’ to their ‘friends’. Last, Mehrabian’s (1996) political 
orientation (Conservativism – Liberalism) scale was adopted to ascertain the 
orientation of participants, and used a seven-item, 7-point Likert scale (strongly 
disagree – strongly agree) [α=.90]. 
 
5. Results 
The mean age of the sample (n=225) was 28.4 years (S.D=10.5) and comprised 57% 
females, with 42% residing in England, 42% Scotland, 11% Wales, 2% Northern 
Ireland, and 3% expatriates. With regard to occupation, 42% were in full-time work 
whereas 47% were in full-time education. Overall the sample had a slight liberal bias 
(political orientation scale mean=4.67). The mean scores further supported this as the 
perceived projected impressions were worse if participants were seen to ‘Like’ the 
Conservative’s page rather than Labour’s (in the visible condition). Additionally, 19 
participants reported having ‘Liked’ Labour’s Facebook page, and 18 had ‘Liked’ the 
Conservatives’ page, these were thus excluded from further analysis. Participants 
(Conservatives, n=9; Labour, n=4) were also excluded from a particular analysis as 
their mean motivation score associated with the focal party was equal to one (i.e. they 
strongly disagreed that they would receive benefit from ‘Liking’ the party’s page). 
Seven participants reported employing privacy settings to limit others from viewing 
their page ‘Likes’ and were removed. Last, the ‘Like’ condition verification questions 
(see above) were analyzed and participants who failed the manipulation check were 
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removed from the sample (n=22). After necessary exclusions the data included 156 
responses for the Conservative party analysis and 162 for the Labour party analysis. 
 
5.1 Hypotheses testing 
The Preacher and Hayes (2008) model of bootstrapped mediation was used to test 
whether increased negative perceived impressions relating to political affiliation (IV) 
is associated with a reduction in intention to ‘Like’ a political party (DV; H1a), and 
whether social anxiety mediates this relationship (M; H1b). The DV was measured on 
the premise that the ‘Like’ would be visible (Scenario 1). The hypothesized 
relationships were tested as one-tailed, while the covariates where directional 
relationships are not hypothesized are tested as two-tailed. The Preacher and Hayes 
(2008) model is well supported within the Information Systems discipline (see Kim 
and Park, 2011; Peñarroja et al, 2015). This model assesses the effect and significance 
of the indirect path (ab) through a bootstrapped confidence interval (see Zhao et al., 
2009), the significance of which is indicated by the upper and lower confidence 
intervals not crossing zero. 
 
For mediation to exist the only necessary condition is significance of the indirect path 
(ab), and is labeled indirect-only mediation. For this to occur the direct path (c) is 
non-significant, meaning the pathway between the IV (X) and DV (Y) can only exist 
through the mediator (Zhao et al., 2009). However, complementary mediation exists 
when the significant presence of the mediator (M) reduces the effect of the pathway 
between the IV (X) and DV (Y), but does not diminish the effect to non-significance. 
In addition the effects of pathways ab, and c must be in the same direction. In 
complementary mediation, a mediator is identified, but potential further mediators 
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exist (for thorough details on the classification of mediation analyses see Zhao et al., 
2009). 
 
Two mediations were tested, one for each political party (see Figure 1). Bootstrap 
resampling was set to 10,000. Political orientation and age were entered as covariates. 
Gender was considered however prior correlation analysis provided no support for 
significant direct relationships with variables within the model (p>.05), therefore was 
not included.  
 
 
Figure 1. Mediation pathway results 
 
Higher scores for projected impressions indicate that the projected image is perceived 
to be more negative (i.e. undesired). For both the Conservatives (n=156, R2(Total)=.316, 
F=23.378, p<.001; R2(direct)=.331, F=18.683, p<.001) and Labour (n=162, 
R2(Total)=.218, F=14.691, p<.001; R
2
(direct)=.267, F=14.283, p<.001), a complementary 
mediation was established (see Figure 1). Thus when the action of ‘Liking’ the party’s 
Projected 
Impression 
Intention 
to ‘Like’ 
Social 
Anxiety 
a b 
c'/c 
β(Lab) = .739*** 
β(Con) = .516*** 
β(Lab) = -.275*** 
β(Con) = -.114* 
ab(Lab) = -.204* 
ab(Con) = -.059* 
β(Lab) = -.621*** / β = -.418***  
β(Con) = -.192**  / β = -.134* 
±n.s.; *p<=.05; **p<=.01; ***p<=.001 
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Facebook page is visible to others, more negative projected impressions associated 
with the political party leads to a reduced intention to ‘Like’ their Facebook page 
(supporting H1a); and is mediated by an increase in social anxiety (Conservative: 
β(ab)=-.059, p<.05), Labour: β(ab)=-.204, p<.05) (supporting H1b). The covariate, 
understood political orientation, was significant for both mediation models 
demonstrating a negative relationship with intention to ‘Like’ for the Conservatives 
(β(direct)=-.304, t=-4.491, p<.001), and a positive relationship for Labour (β(direct)=.176, 
t=2.278, p=.024). Thus, less liberal individuals showed a greater intention to ‘Like’ 
the Conservatives’ Facebook page, and more liberal individuals an increased intention 
to ‘Like’ Labour’s Facebook page. While this is clearly an intuitive finding given the 
parties’ respective positions on the political spectrum, this supports the validity of our 
data and provides a foundation to later findings. Age was found to have a negative 
association with intention to ‘Like’ in the mediated model for Conservatives (β=-.016, 
p=.031). This was mirrored to some extent in the Labour model with regards to the 
coefficient (β=-.016), however, we can only infer that age was approaching 
significance (p=.102).  
 
Two repeated measures ANOVAs, one for each party, were conducted to examine the 
intention to ‘Like’ each party page under the different visibility conditions (visible vs. 
secret). Age was entered as a covariate. Separate analyses were favored as combined 
analyses would have reduced the sample size to those participants who were 
motivated somewhat to like both parties. The Bonferroni correction was applied. The 
within-subjects tests for both parties revealed significant differences across visibility 
conditions (Conservatives, n=156, F=13.85, df=1, p < .001, ηp
2=.08; Labour, n=162, 
F=16.68, df=1, p <.001, ηp
2=.09). The pairwise comparisons revealed that intention to 
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‘Like’ in secret was significantly greater than intention when affiliation would be 
visible (Conservative mean-diff=.79; Labour mean-diff=.72) (Figure 2). Age was not 
found to be significant in either model (p>.05). These findings support H2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean intention to ‘Like’ each party’s page under the visible and secret 
conditions 
 
6. Discussion 
Overall, the results supported the notion that ‘Liking’ a political party is of self-
presentational concern for users (Kwon and Moon, 2014; Macafee, 2013). Support of 
H1a demonstrated that more negative projected impressions are associated with 
visibly affiliating with a party and a lower intention to ‘Like’. Moreover, this 
relationship was mediated by social anxiety, thereby supporting H1b and the process 
outlined in the self-presentation literature (see Leary, 1996; Leary and Kowalski, 
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1995). This is corroborated by recent reports that young Conservative voters are 
embarrassed to let others know for whom they vote (see Sanghani, 2015). Having 
controlled for political orientation, and so to an extent the variation in intention to 
‘Like’ explained by alignment of a party’s orientation with participants’ own values, 
the significant relationships found highlight the impact of audience standards on 
behavioral intentions. 
 
This study indicates that audiences act to constrain ‘Liking’ behaviors as users 
practice protective impression management (i.e. avoiding visible affiliation) to 
circumvent self-presentational predicaments. This supports Kwon and Moon’s (2014) 
finding of self-censorship of political posts in the presence of diverse audiences. As 
did Kwon and Moon (2014), we illustrate a flipside to Macafee’s (2013) argument 
that self-presentation is a core motivator for ‘Liking’ a page in order to maintain or 
promote a desired identity; we find the same driver is also a de-motivator. This 
highlights the presence of both approach and avoidance behaviors (see Carver and 
Scheier, 2001) in political affiliation within SNS. 
 
This research brings into contrast political communication through SNSs compared 
with more traditional media (e.g. newspapers, television). Traditional media afforded 
the benefits of political communication and the freedom to receive this largely 
without the scrutiny of others. However, on SNSs this is not the case, with 
conspicuous affiliation hindering behavior that will open these communication 
channels. Thus, this research provides some explanation of the differences observed 
between voter share for a party in the UK general election and the number of 
Facebook fans the party has, despite the widespread diffusion of Facebook in the 
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population. So whilst people do like a party they may not click ‘Like’ on the party’s 
page due to the impression this would project to others. This phenomenon illustrates a 
number of challenges: for managers who wish to leverage this means of 
communicating with fans and followers; for users to benefit from such 
communication but also to maintain a desired online persona; and for site designers to 
help address the aforementioned paradox. 
 
The findings suggest that older users are less inclined to ‘Like’ political party pages. 
Albeit counter-intuitive to the general consensus that political engagement broadly 
increases with age (Quintelier, 2007), our finding concurs with Rainie et al, (2012) 
who found too that younger people are more politically active through social media. 
However the results do not support that this negative relationship between age and 
intention to ‘Like’ is due to self-presentational concern. Specifically age was not 
significantly associated with social anxiety nor was it in predicting differences in 
intention to ‘Like’ between the visible vs. secret conditions. We propose two reasons 
why older people have a lower intention to ‘Like’ political pages: firstly, older users 
may be less motivated to accumulate new information about parties as their political 
tendencies become more fixed over time (Quintelier, 2007); secondly, older people 
are generally less active using functions within Facebook as a whole (McAndrew and 
Jeong, 2012). 
 
Addressing H2, we provided further support for the self-presentational issue 
evidenced previously and the support for this hypothesis hints at a means to resolve 
this. For both parties, electorates’ intention to ‘Like’ was significantly greater under 
the secret condition than when the ‘Like’ was visible. This is explained by Goffman’s 
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(1973) notion of region behavior, where people are freer to act as they like once they 
have retreated backstage away from their audience. Providing adequate privacy and 
increasing interactions with content on SNSs has often been referred to as paradoxical 
(see Bonneau and Preibusch, 2009). Designers tread a fine line between increased 
visibility and content versus the privacy needs of users; our results suggest that in the 
context of ‘Liking’ political parties on SNSs, the status quo is suboptimal. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This research contributes to theory on impression management within SNSs by 
providing knowledge of the effect of visible affiliation with a political party on 
emotion and behavioral intention. Particularly, we conclude that when visible 
association with a political party’s page is perceived to project a negative image to 
others, social anxiety is felt and intention to ‘Like’ is reduced. Akin with this, users 
showed greater intention to ‘Like’ a page if this was secret (i.e. no visible affiliation) 
in contrast to the current status quo where page ‘Likes’ are visible. Thus, our research 
provides a reason why even popular political parties receive fewer ‘Likes’ than would 
be expected. Whilst political pages were the contextual focus of this research, the 
knowledge and implications will be useful to any organization with a SNS presence, 
and specifically to those where visible affiliation may be a cause for concern (e.g. 
alcohol brands or Non-Government Organizations associated with a strong set of 
beliefs and values).  
 
7.1 Implications 
Currently Facebook allows users to make pages as a whole private but not on a page-
by-page basis. However, neither a blanket approach to making all pages private nor 
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having users refrain from ‘Liking’ pages due to impression management concerns is 
favorable for managers or users who benefit from this gateway interaction (see 
Hanson et al., 2010; Hollenbeck and Katia, 2011; Lipsman et al., 2012). We suggest 
that site designers consider the option to make the affiliation with individual pages 
private, both after ‘Liking’ and at the moment of choice (i.e. when clicking ‘Like’ on 
a page users are presented with the option of this being ‘secret’). Although this seems 
like a simple fix, there are issues that must be considered akin with the ‘value of a 
fan’ (Lipsman et al., 2012). A ‘Secret Like’ would exclude ‘stories about friends’ as a 
vehicle for sharing impressions to connections. Furthermore, under the assumption 
that ‘Secret Likes’ would not contribute to the total number of ‘Likes’ articulated on 
fan pages, lesser visible popularity may have a detrimental effect on attitudes of SNS 
users visiting these pages. With regards to Facebook itself, given ‘Secret Likes’ has 
the potential for increasing page linkages, this has the opportunity of creating 
increased revenue through the ‘promoted post’ function. With regards ‘Secret Likes’ 
the benefits and potential issues need careful consideration alongside long-term goals 
of both SNSs and organizations that operate pages. 
 
7.2 Limitations and future research 
The present research has several strengths. First, it employed a well-established 
theoretical lens to understand a novel and timely phenomenon of interest to political 
parties, site designers and brands more generally. Second, it used a sample of eligible 
voters and SNS users motivated somewhat to ‘Like’ the focal party pages. Third, a 
stringent multi-level randomization process was used to avoid order bias but still 
afforded the benefits of within-subject analyses such as increased power and 
decreased bias associated with individual differences (see Poulton, 1982).  
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Despite its strengths, the research has a number of limitations offering fruitful 
avenues of further research. First, although social anxiety was found to be a 
significant mediator in addressing H1b, the effects of this were only complimentary, 
suggesting further research is needed to uncover omitted mediators. We suggest that 
researchers examine the role of ‘expectancy’ that others will actually see when a user 
has ‘Liked’ a party (i.e. perceived chance that affiliation will be seen; see Carver and 
Scheier, 2001; Leary and Kowalski, 1995) and the role of multiple audiences with 
diverse political ideologies (see Kwon and Moon, 2014). Second, we support the need 
for future experimental research that employs behavioral or physiological measures to 
overcome the limitations of self-report scales (see Podaksoff, 1986). Third, this 
research did not contend with the notion that ‘Liking’ a page is an admission of 
positive attitude (as the name of the practice infers); further studies should consider 
gateway interaction levels under different conditions with less positive connotations 
(e.g. when behavior is labeled as subscribing or following) as these may have a subtle 
but significant effect on the social desirability of affiliation. Fourth, further research 
should consider additional variables that may predict the intention of ‘Liking’ a 
political party, giving a more holistic understanding of this gateway behavior. We 
suggest political interest, political engagement, and public self-consciousness be 
considered. Fifth, future studies should investigate the likelihood and factors 
surrounding users’ intention to ‘Like’ more than one competing party. Last, the 
sample consisted of a largely university-educated young electorate from the UK, with 
a slight liberal bias. While limiting generalizability, this age group makes up a high 
proportion of SNS users and therefore insight into them is the most pressing (Duggan 
23 
 
et al., 2015). Nevertheless, this research should be replicated in different 
demographics in the UK and also with electorates from other countries.  
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Appendix 1.  
Scale items: Descriptive statistics and factor loadings 
 
Projected 
Impressions 
Please imagine the scenario where you have 'Liked' [X Party’s] Facebook page 
and evidence of this has become visible to your Facebook 'friends'. Please 
indicate along the scale what image of yourself you consider this would portray 
to others. 
Labour Conservative 
Items Mean S.D Load Mean S.D Load 
1. Pleasant - 
Unpleasant 
3.71 1.18 .87 5.15 1.48 .92 
2. Positive - 
Negative 
3.75 1.21 .87 5.22 1.49 .92 
3. Good - Bad 3.62 1.13 .90 5.22 1.43 .94 
4. Attractive – 
Unattractive  
4.12 .98 .83 4.95 1.51 .90 
5. Desired – 
Undesired 
4.12 1.06 .83 5.07 1.48 .90 
Social Anxiety  Please indicate how you would feel if your Facebook friends saw that you had 
'Liked' the [X Party's] Facebook page: 
Labour Conservative 
Items Mean S.D Load Mean S.D Load 
1. Happy -Unhappy  4.14 1.41 .77 5.28 1.52 .77 
2. Relaxed - 
Anxious 
3.63 1.55 .95 4.42 1.69 .95 
3. Calm – Tense 3.54 1.54 .96 4.34 1.70 .96 
4. Not worried – 
Worried 
3.42 1.60 .94 4.22 1.78 .93 
Intention to 
‘Like’ (Visible 
Condition) 
Scenario: Your 'Like' of the [X Party's] Facebook Page is VISIBLE to your 
friends. When you click 'Like' on the [X Party's] Facebook page it will be visible 
to your friends. Please indicate the likelihood you would do the following before 
the 2015 General Election: 
Labour Conservative 
Items Mean S.D Load Mean S.D Load 
1. Click Like on 
the page 
2.19 1.56 .94 1.64 1.12 .90 
2. Receive updates 
from the [X 
Parties’] by Liking 
their page 
2.28 1.60 .94 1.77 1.28 .90 
Intention to 
‘Like’ (Secret 
Condition) 
Scenario: 'Secret Like' of the [X Party's] Facebook Page (i.e., NOT visible to 
your friends in anyway). Please imagine that Facebook offered a function called 
'Secret Like' so that you would receive the posts from the page you 'Liked' but 
doing so would NOT be made visible to your Facebook Friends or the general 
public in anyway. Based on your 'Like' being SECRET, please indicate with 
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regards to the [X Party's] Facebook page the likelihood you would do the 
following before the 2015 General Election:  
 Labour Conservative 
Items Mean S.D Load Mean S.D Load 
1. Click Like on 
the page 
3.01 2.01 .97 2.39 1.91 .96 
2. Receive updates 
from the [X 
Parties’] by Liking 
their page 
2.91 1.93 .97  2.49 1.94 .96 
 
 
Appendix 2. 
Items and descriptive statistics for motivation to receive party content participant  
qualifier. 
 
Motivation to receive party 
content 
Do you feel receiving content about the 2015 UK General 
Election from the [X Party] in your news feed would be... 
Labour Conservative 
Items Mean (S.D) Mean (S.D) 
1. Informative 4.60 (1.47) 3.90 (1.88) 
2. Interesting 4.32 (1.51) 3.77 (1.90) 
3. Amusing 3.29 (1.40) 2.87 (1.52) 
4. Funny 2.93 (1.36) 2.44 (1.38) 
5. Thought Provoking 4.38 (1.47) 3.78 (1.85) 
6. Entertaining 3.20 (1.36) 2.73 (1.40) 
7. Enlightening 3.87 (1.58) 3.40 (1.74) 
8. Confirmatory of your views 4.24 (1.50) 3.59 (1.84) 
9. Useful 4.40 (1.54) 3.80 (1.79) 
10. Revealing 4.12 (1.40) 3.88 (1.72) 
 
